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SOCIAL GRACE 
Robert M. Doran, Sf 
Marquette University 
I HAVE LONG REGARDED Bernard Lonergan's 1977 address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," as one of his finest papers. It expresses as well as anything 
he wrote just what his work was really all about. Moreover, it opens upon 
possible developments of that work. 
On a more personal note, reading "Natural Right and Historical 
Mindedness" always takes me back to chapter 7 of Insight. My reading 
of that chapter was the beginning of my committed involvement with 
Lonergan's work. Both writings attempt the articulation of the intelligibility 
of "a single object that can gain collective attention," l an intelligibility that 
can be articulated even though the situations that embody it are a~ a whole 
"commonly ... neither foreseen nor intended" by most people affected by 
them.2 In chapter 7 of Insight this single object is, in the words of the title of the 
chapter, "Common Sense as Object," while in "Natural Right and Historical 
Mindedness" it is "collective responsibility," the coalescence of "the manifold 
of isolated responsibilities" into the unfolding of a history that flows from a 
total and dialectical source of meaning.3 In each case the issue is the relation 
between a subjective field and at least a portion of what would play in 
Lonergan's thought something of the role that objective Geist plays in Hegel'S. 
Thus chapter 6 of Insight is called "Common Sense and Its Subject" and 
chapter 7 "Common Sense as Object," but "common sense as object" means 
at least partly the objectification in culture and society of the subjective field 
introduced in chapter 6; again, in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," 
the question is how "the issues that individuals have to deal with in their own 
1 Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," A Third Collection, ed. 
Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 176. 
2 Ibid. 169. 
3 Ibid. 176. 
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minds and hearts" become 'writ large' in the dialectic of history.4 These are 
essentially the same topics. They are major topics. They must be addressed 
, 
and Lonergan has given us some of the tools to do just that. 
Now the interest that began for me in reading chapter 7 of Insight and 
that gained precision from the presentation in "Natural Right and Historical 
Mindedness" of the plateaus on which that "single object" unfoldss became, 
in some manner whose details can probably never be traced, the inspiration 
behind much of what I tried to do in Theology and the Dialectics of History. In 
my ongoing work, I am revisiting basic points of that work, and I find that 
theology elevates "collective responsibility," in tl).e concrete dispensation 
that is ours, into something like "social and cultural grace." By this term I 
mean the objectification, the being writ large i:Q.·the over arching dialectic of 
history, of God's entry into human affairs in the divine love that floods Our 
inmost hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us and in the 
revelation of that love in Christ Jesus. The issue is the historical effects of the 
divine missions. What difference does it make to the dialectical processes of 
human history that there is a universal offer of what Christians call the Holy 
Spirit? What difference does it make to the same dialectic that the mission 
of the Son is among other things a revelation in incarnate and linguistic 
meaning of that universal offer? Here again, there are a subj~ctive and an 
objective obverse and reverse. It is as though there are several manners in 
which to express the correlative subjective fields and objectifications: in one 
version they are "Common Sense and Its Subject" and "Common Sense as 
Object"; in another they are "the issues that individuals have to deal with 
in their own minds and hearts" and the coalescence of their negotiations of 
those issues into the dialectic of history; and in the present effort they are 
the reality that is given to many individuals and in fact that is offered to all, 
a reality that Catholic theology understands as participation in divine, that 
is, Trinitarian life, and that good Catholic systematic theology differentiates 
precisely in its Trinitarian form, and the coalescence of those individual 
gifts into a single object that can gain collective attention, an object that we 
might call the social objectification of grace, or in shorthand social grace, or 
in biblical terms the reign of God in human history. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The plateaus of 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness' are the stages of meaning 
in Method in Theology, but their function as objectifications of the "single object that can gain 
collective attention" is much clearer in "Natural Right." See Bernard Lonergan, Method in 
Theology (latest printing, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 85-99. 
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--There is a second context, however, for my present remarks. It is the 
ongoing context of what I hope will be an annual colloquium at Marquette 
University sponsored by the Marquette Lonergan Project, a colloquium on 
''Doing Catholic Systematic Theology in a Multi-religious World." At the 
first of these colloquia, held last October, papers by John Dadosky, Darren 
Dias, and myself emphasized the universal mission of the Holy Spirit as a 
central locus of twenty-first century Catholic systematics, stressed Frederick 
Crowe's position on the relations of the mission of the Spirit and the Son, and 
brought into play and updated with Lonergan's help some central Ignatian 
insights regarding discernment and dialogue.6 The upshot of the colloquium 
was twofold: the shared recognit ion of the need for greater clarity regarding 
the mission of the Son in relation to that of the Holy Spirit, but also a subtle 
agreement (subtle, at least in that for the most part it took the form of an 
absence of non-agreement) with my position that the global implications of 
Lonergan's scale of values provide an extraordinary litmus test regarding 
the major authenticity of the various religious traditions in our world, 
where 'major authenticity' refers not to the authenticity of individuals vis-
a-vis their traditions but to the authenticity of the traditions themselves as 
currently appropriated and implemented or exercised. 
The two results of the colloquium are complementary. The mission of 
the Word is carried on, participated in, both in the church and beyond the 
church, partly through the gifts and vocations of theologians, philosophers, 
scientists both natural and human, and scholars, all speaking intelligible 
words of truth, justice, and reconciliation to a broken world. Of special 
importance are breakthroughs whose significance could so reorganize the 
social mediation of the human good that genuine transformation of social 
structures would take place. Paradigmatic in this regard, at least in its 
intention and I think partly in its execution, is Lonergan's economic insight 
into the real significance of the potential social dividend that surplus income 
yields.7 
At any rate, it is time for theology to turn its attention explicitly to 
social grace, in the context of both divine missions. Liberation theologians 
6 The three papers can be found in PDF and audio on the website www.lonerganresource. 
com, under Events: Conferences: October 29-30 2009. 
7 I suspect that the economic situation today, where macroeconomic dynamics are 
absorbed in information technology much more than when Lonergan was writing, will force us 
to add complications to Lonergan's model of economic process, but I gladly confess that I am 
singularly unequipped to say just what these may be. 
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and others have made us aware of the social objectifications of sin. These 
objectifications were already captured by Lonergan in chapter 19 of Insight 
where he speaks of the 'moral evils' that are the consequences of 'basic sin.'s 
Most of us have little difficulty today in acknowledging the existence of 
"sinful social structures/' that is, of the social and cultural coalescence into 
a single object of manifold refusals or failures to do what is right or to reject 
what is wrong. But we should also attempt to disengage just what would 
be the structure of the coalescence into a single object of manifold instances, 
first, of fidelity to the transcendental precepts, and second, of the elevating 
and healing divine grace that maintains one as copsistently faithful to these 
precepts. 
The transcendental imperatives themselv.es are nature, in fact precisely 
part of the nature that is the immanent principle of movement and rest in 
'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness.'9 Refusal or failure to observe 
the imperatives, though, is sin, and recovery or redemption occurs through 
a grace that elevates the nature whose law is expressed in the imperatives to 
participation in a radically other nature, a Trinitarian nature that is absolutely 
supernatural in that it cannot be attained in any immediate fashion by any 
created nature whatsoever, except and only insofar as it gives itself, bestows 
itself in gratuitous and extravagant generosity, even wastefulness, upon an 
obediential potency that is capable only of receiving it. This is the upshot of 
Lonergan's brilliant treatment of moral impotence in chapter 18 of Insight, 
an analysis that is permanently valid despite his own disclaimers regarding 
his approach to the dynamics of decision in that work.10 
However, by the time of "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness/' 
the source of progress or normative source of meaning in history resides not 
simply in the transcendental precepts but in the coalescence of individual 
8 See Bernard Lonergan, CWL 3 689-91 . 
9 I say "as part of nature" because, as we will see in a moment, embracing and including 
the transcendental notions that constitute the levels of intentional consciousness is the "tidal 
movement" that begins before intentional consciousness, permeates it as it moves through its 
various questions and answers, and reaches beyond it in being in love. That is the primary 
meaning of 'nature' in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," and to the extent that the 
love is God's own love, that nature is obediential potency for grace. 
10 The disclaimer, I think, is only partially correct: there is a second presentation of those 
dynamics, one that achieves inchoate expression in chapter 2 of Method in Theology. But, as I 
have argued in several places, each presentation has its limited validity, and neither is to be 
discarded. See www.lonerganresource.com under 'Books': Essays in Systematic Theology, items 
18 and 19. 
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responsibilities, in the communities that are faithful to the demands of 
ongoing self-transcendence, communities toward which the levels of 
consciousness themselves are oriented precisely because of their function 
in a "tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through 
sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only 
to find its rest beyond all of these" in "being-in-love."ll And the source 
of decline now resides in collective infidelity to these demands, while the 
source of redemption or recovery in history lies, we may surmise (though 
this is not mentioned as such in the paper), in the coalescence into common 
living of the individual gifts of participation in Trinitarian life that God has 
bestowed, whether explicitly or anonymously. The self that God bestows 
on a nature that is obediential potency to receive it is Trinitarian and so 
interpersonal, and the bestowal itself has a Trinitarian and so interpersonal 
structure,l2 What John Dadosky has called the fourth stage of meaning 
begins, I submit, with this movement beyond acknowledging the individual 
interiority of intentional consciousness to acknowledging an interpersonal 
level of consciousness, where, as Lonergan said as early as his Latin work 
on the Trinity, the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love 
itselfY This interpersonal dimension coalesces into communities faithful to 
what the turn to interiority revealed in the first place.14 If this fidelity is itself 
a function ultimately of grace, then the expression "social grace" assumes 
some valid significance, at least as much significance as the expression 
"social sin." 
I am focusing on the contribution that Theology and the Dialectics of 
History might make to the question of just precisely what is the structure 
of the social objectifications of divine grace. In biblical language, what is 
the structure of the reign of God in history? The basic move comes with 
the recognition that the scale of values articulated on pp. 31-32 of Method 
in Theology and spelled out in greater detail in Theology and the Dialectics of 
11 Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," 175. 
12 For an attempt to understand this interpersonal Trinitarian structure, see Robert M. 
Doran, 'Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum 
Fidei,' to appear in Lonergan Workshop 23. 
13 See Bernard Lonergan, CWL 12 218-29. 
14 See John D. Dadosky, "Midwiving the Fourth Stage of Meaning: Lonergan and 
Doran," in Meaning and History in Systematic Theology, ed. John D. Dadosky (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2009) 71 -92; also in the same book at 331-43 Philip McShane, 'The 
Fourth Stage of Meaning: Essay 44 of the Series Field Nocturnes Cantower.' 
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History is an objectification of the structure of individual consciousness, just 
as "Common Sense as Object" is an objectification of "The Subjective Field 
of Common Sense," and just as negotiation of the issues that individuals 
have to deal with in their own minds and hearts coalesces into the situations 
that emerge from the dialectic of history. The scale of values is the structure 
of intentional consciousness writ large, and its unfolding is the unfolding 
of the coalescence of individual authenticity and inauthenticity into a 
single object that can gain collective attention. The relationship between the 
structure of consciousness and the scale of values, then, is analogous to that 
between the same structure and functional speci,alization, in that in each 
case we are speaking of a communal objectification of a subjective structure. 
Each section of Theology and the Dialectics of Mis tory needs to be interpreted 
in relation to the issues understood in this manner. In the present paper I can 
address only the basic terms and relations proposed in the book, as these are 
introduced in the first part. 
"Basic Terms and Relations," then, is the title of part 1 of the book. 
Needless to say, the first set of such terms and relations consists of those 
found in Lonergan's analysis of conscious intentionality. These are traced 
in chapter 1 in accord with their chronological emergence in Lonergan's 
thought: the self-affirmation of the knower, the emergence of a distinct fourth 
level, the post-Method focus on love and the possibility of an affirmation of 
a fifth level, the two vectors in consciousness - the creative vector moving 
from below upward and the healing vector moving from above downward. 
These together are conceived now as constituting some of the dynamics 
of the normative source of meaning that becomes a central category in 
"Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." But first, that normative source 
of meaning must be filled out by acknowledging another dimension of 
consciousness. This insistence is present in 'Natural Right and Historical 
Mindedness' itself, where the dynamics of intentional consciousness are 
part of the tidal movement that I have just mentioned. This movement 
precisely as movement assumes conscious form in the dispositional or 
aesthetic-dramatic participation of the sensitive psyche in the adventure 
of conscious intentionality, an adventure that Eric Voegelin has called the 
search for direction in the movement of life.15 Second, the total source of 
meaning in history includes bias and its effects, as well as conversion in the 
15 See Eric Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture," in Jesus and Man's Hope, ed. D.G. Miller 
and D.Y. Hadidian (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1971) 63. 
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movement from above downward. The sensitive psyche is left to chapter 2 
in Theology and the Dialectics of History, but the dialectical functioning of bias 
and the healing of conversion are included in chapter l's presentation of 
Lonergan's development. 
I found it essential even fifteen years ago to relate this discussion to the 
notion of 'patterned experience' that appears toward the end of chapter 1. 
This notion already situates this structure in the dialectic of history, in the 
context, if you want, of the relative dominance of the dialectic of community 
vis-a.-vis a plurality of individual dialectics of subjects. The notion of 
patterned experience became for me later what I call 'received meaning' 
as partly constitutive of empirical consciousness itself. All empirical 
consciousness, except for surprising events, is patterned experience. 
Presentations - sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, bodily 
movements, associations, spontaneous intersubjective responses, free 
images, utterances16 - are patterned presentations. Some of these patterns 
are governed by interests that we have made our own, and then we enter 
a given pattern because it is something we have chosen or accepted or 
perhaps been chosen for, whether the pattern be artistic or intellectual or 
practical or dramatic or mystical, to name the principal possibilities. But 
the pattern can be a function not only of my own self-determined interests, 
but also of psychological, social, economic, political, linguistic conditioning 
and seeming determinisms, conditioning operating 'from above' in one's 
development to establish schemes of recurrence that are inimical to 
development, and so not a function of autonomous artistic, intellectual, 
practical, interpersonal, or mystical orientations, but of psychological and 
social pressures. The person governed by negative patterns may also tend 
to believe that this is the way it has to be, that there is no alternative. Then 
the patterning is under the control of a bias, but in this case a bias that is 
not one's own doing. What is required is a recognition that can initiate a 
reinterpretation; the reinterpretation makes possible new patterns and the 
appropriation of the power to establish patterns of experience on the basis 
of new interests. Such a recognition occurs through a set of insights, includ-
ing the "inverse insights" that interrupt the very flow of one's conscious 
16 Why has it taken us so long to recognize the hermeneutic significance of Insight's 
placing on the level of empirical consciousness the 'free images' and 'utterances' that 
"commonly are under the influence of the higher levels before they provide a basis for inquiry 
and reflection?" Lonergan, CWL 3 299. 
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intentionality with the recognition that one is on the wrong track. But such 
insights occur outside the normal patterns, outside the box, if you want, and 
launch a possibility of a new interpretation of experience, induding the 
acknowledgment that insight itself is what begins to break these patterns. 
Next is the further owning not just of a spirit of inquiry but also of the 
ability for critical reflection on one's own insights. What is the guarantee 
that the new insight or set of insights is not just the function of a new 
arbitrary and falsifying way of patterning experience? And we rise above 
the conditioned patterns of our experience not only by insight and judgment 
but also and primarily by decision, in which we sel.ect what it is worthwhile 
to do, what kind of world we want, what kind of people we want to be, and 
how we are going to move toward that. Finally,' only being on the receiving 
end of a love that is unconditional and so graced, however that love may be 
mediated by human community, is the ultimate condition of possibility of 
such recovery and redemption. 
Already by the end of chapter I, then, the structure of intentional 
consciousness is coalescing into a single object that can command collective 
attention. A crucial second step in determining the basic terms and relations 
comes with the acknowledgment that consciousness is twofold, 'and so 
that the relatively dominant dialectic of community as it issues in received 
meaning, meaning that Eugene Gendlin argues becomes stored in the body 
for better or for worse,17 can affect either or both of its dimensions, and can 
do so either positively or negatively. I now make capital of the following 
quotation from The Triune God: Systematics: "[W]e are conscious in two ways: 
in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we 
sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys 
and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active 
when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to 
utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, 
and exercise our will in order to act." lS The entire argument of Theology and 
the Dialectics of History from chapter 2 forward depends on what is affirmed 
in that sentence. As chapter 2 of Method in Theology speaks of operational 
17 See, e.g., Eugene Gendlin, Let Your Body Interpret Your Dreams (Wilmette, 1L: Chiron 
Publications, 1986). Gendlin's more theoretical Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (Toronto: 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) was helpful to me in my early statements on psychic conversion. 
See Robert M. Doran, Subject and Psyche, rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
1994),115-17, 169-72. 
18 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 139. 
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development and a distinct affective development, so the self-appropriation 
that constitutes the "total and basic science"19 has to include the vagaries 
of the dispositional, aesthetic-dramatic dimension of the sensitive psyche 
that precedes, accompanies, and overarches the operations of conscious 
intentionality, influences those operations, and is influenced by them. Self-
appropriation without this dimension runs the risk of fostering the basic 
form of alienation, alienation from one's very self. As Heidegger affirmed 
Verstehen and Befindlichkeit to be equiprimordial but distinct ways of being 
Dasein/o so I am affirming that the aesthetic-dramatic dimension is always 
co-constitutive of consciousness along with our intentional operations. And 
perhaps beyond Heidegger, I maintain that this dimension includes its own 
set of aesthetic-dramatic operators of human development. In like manner, 
if consciousness is a search for direction in the movement of life, the search 
is a function of intentional inquiry, while the movement is experienced in 
the pulsing flow of the aesthetic dimension. The two together are essential 
ingredients of the notion of dialectic that, along with the scale of values, 
functions as the key category in the entire work. 
That notion of dialectic constitutes the next installment on basic terms 
and relations. From the addition of the psychic, dispositional, aesthetic-
dramatic dimension to the structure of the normative and total sources 
of meaning in history, there comes a refinement on Lonergan's notion of 
dialectic. For Lonergan 'dialectic' refers to the concrete, the dynamic, and 
the contradictory. The refinement is to the effect that 'dialectic' is a notion 
that refers to the concrete, the dynamic, and the opposed, but that opposition 
can take two quite distinct forms. I believe this complex notion is already 
operative in chapters 6 and 7 of Insight, though it is not articulate there 
precisely as a complication of the basic notion. We are conscious in two ways, 
one being more passive than active, the other more active than passive. 
These two ways are not contradictory to one another, unless they become so 
when one of them is neglected in favor of the other. Their opposition I call, 
for better or for worse, that of contraries rather than of contradictories. To 
confuse contradictories and contraries or mix them up with one another can 
be quite disastrous, not only theoretically but also existentially. 
19 Bernard Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response," CWL 17 355. 
20 "In understanding and state-oj-mind, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being 
the 'there.''' Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 171-72. 'Understanding' translates Verstehen, and 'state-of-
mind,' Befindlichkeit. 
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I know this distinction has been a bone of contention among some, but 
I continue to hold to it, and for very serious reasons. I first came upon the 
distinction by negotiating the Jungian tendency to reduce all oppositions to 
what I am calling contraries and so to attempt to achieve a position beyond 
good and evil: a tendency that I regard as self-destructive and perhaps 
even demonic. But there is the other tendency, all too prevalent in Christian 
spirituality and moral teaching, and, may I add, in some of the "effective 
history" of Lonergan's own work, to regard the contrariness of sense and 
spirituality, neural demands and the censorship, intersubjectivity and 
practical intelligence, as a matter of contradictories and so, practically, to 
neglect or even suppress the sensitive psyche and intersubjectivity as if they 
were evil, and, theoretically, to interpret all the' limitation that is imposed 
on intentional operations by their dependence on sense as itself, if not evil 
at least as concupiscent. I was dismayed to find Lonergan himself doing 
this when, in a response to a question asked him at a Lonergan Workshop 
regarding the notion of limitation that he sets in tension with transcendence 
in some brilliant paragraphs in chapter 15 of Insight, he limited his response 
to the discussion of the limitation imposed by moral impotence and sin.21 
That is not what he is talking about when he first introduces the notion 
of limitation. Of course, to regard the criteria of the world of immediacy 
as though they were the criteria of human knowing in a world mediated 
by meaning does set up something contradictory, and the remedy for that 
philosophical blunder is, in Lonergan's terms, to break the duality of our 
knowing and to affirm that fully human knowing unfolds through the three 
dimensions of experience, understanding, and judgment. But breaking the 
duality of knowing does not mean breaking the duality of consciousness. It 
means rather affirming that duality in the series of sublations of empirical 
consciousness by the intelligent, ra tiona 1, and existentially world -constitutive 
and self-constitutive operations of human conscious intentionality. To break 
the duality of the unity-in-tension of consciousness in favor of either sense 
or intellect is to invite either empiricism or idealism, whereas to affirm 
their unity-in-tension is to affirm at least implicitly a critical realism, where 
insights are into imagined data, where verification almost always entails a 
rational return to concrete sensible data, and where apprehensions of possible 
21 This session (16 June 1980) appears on www.bernardlonergan.com as 97300AOE080, 
with a transcription at 97300DTE080. Lonergan's comments on limitation appear at the very 
beginning. 
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values are given in insights laden with feeling. The dialectical structure of 
the aesthetic-dramatic and intentional ways of being conscious is then writ 
large in the dialectic of community between intersubjectivity and practical 
intelligence and in what I would like to promote as an emerging dialectic 
of culture between cosmological and anthropological sets of constitutive 
meaning. Contradictory dialectical relations obtain not internally to these 
distinct but related processes, but with regard to requisite higher syntheses: 
the higher synthesis of the dialectic of the subject in the acceptance or 
rejection of grace; that of the dialectic of culture in the acceptance or rejection 
of personal authenticity; and that of the dialectic of community in the pursuit 
or refusal of cultural values. 
Lonergan's scale of values is complicated to yield an explanatory 
account of the relations of these three sets of dialectical processes. And 
it is also expanded to present a basic optic on the global situation of our 
time, yielding a sympathetic impetus to the best of liberation theology in its 
insistence on a certain preferential option for the poor and the marginalized. 
Finally, the section on 'Basic Terms and Relations' concludes with a 
chapter that begins to express some of the dynamics of the church's mission 
in the world. liAs the Father has sent me, so I send you." Those dynamics 
would be swept by a systematic theology into a more heuristic view of the 
church understood in reliance on the category of mission, where ecclesial 
mission becomes a participation in the missions of both the Son and the 
Spirit in the world, just as the character of 'servant' that was highlighted in 
the chapter on the church in Theology and Dialectics of History understood the 
church as participating in Jesus' embodiment and fulfillment of the Deutero-
Isaian vision of the servant of God. 
In conclusion, then, just as there is a graced elevation of the various 
levels of consciousness (the relation of religious and personal values), so 
the presence of grace can be acknowledged also at the levels of cultural 
and social values with an impact on vital values. The establishment of a 
category of social grace will depend on arguing that the objectification of 
the subjective structure of intentional consciousness that is found in the 
complete scale of values can, like intentional consciousness itself, receive 
a graced elevation to the participation of society in divine life, in divine 
meaning and in the divine community of the three persons of the Trinity. The 
state of grace, as Lonergan begins to argue in the still neglected sixth chapter 
of his Trinitarian systematics, is a social, interpersonal situation. It is likely 
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that we will be able to locate in communal living an objectification at the 
level of social values of the kind of elevation of the level of understanding 
that grace brings to individual consciousness, and that we will be able to 
locate in the same communal living an objectification at the level of cultural 
values of the kind of elevation of the level of judgment that accrues from 
elevating grace. Moreover, further work on the relation of religious to 
personal values will disclose an elevation of the operations of deliberation, 
evaluation, and decision, and this will no doubt find objectification in the 
communal sphere of policies and planning. The next move in a systematics 
based on Lonergan's work, will, I suspect, be the <1bjectification in culture 
and society of the individual structure of consciousness gifted by God with 
the grace of an unconditional and unqualified l<We. 
